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Trusting behavior has been shown to affect households’ portfolio choice between risky and 
risk-free financial assets. We extend the analysis of the effect of trust on portfolio choice to 
include the dominant component of households’ portfolios, real estate. In a simple model, we 
show how the effect of trust on expected investment returns affects portfolio composition, 
including the share of real estate. Using data from the European Social Survey, we estimate 
individual-level trust as an unobserved attitude using survey questions on personal attitudes 
by applying a hierarchical item response model. Combining these estimates with data on 
Spanish households’ financial decisions from the Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 
conducted by the Bank of Spain, we show that households with less trust invest more in 
housing and less in financial assets, in particular risky ones. Trust thus may drive not only 
(limited) stock market participation, but financial development more generally. 
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While most of the literature on portfolio choice has focussed on holdings of risky assets, the asset
class that actually dominates private asset holdings is real estate. This is true across countries, as
illustrated e.g. by Bover, Martinez-Carrasco and Velilla (2005) for Italy, Spain, the UK and the
U.S.. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show portfolio composition across the Spanish wealth distribution
in terms of Euro values and portfolio shares. It is striking that for almost 90% of households,
real estate constitutes the dominant portfolio component. In fact, among home owners, only the
richest households hold any signicant amount of nancial assets at all. They are also the main
holders of risky assets; Figure 2 shows that barely any lower and middle class households hold
risky assets. While at 82% the homeownership rate is slightly higher in Spain than in Italy, the
UK or the U.S., where it lies around 70%, real estate constitutes the most important portfolio
component in these countries, too (Bover et al. 2005). Given the dominance of real estate in
most households' portfolios, it is important to include it when analyzing portfolio choice.
In contrast to this, the focus of the literature on household portfolio decisions has been on the
choice between risky and non-risky assets, and in particular on explaining limited stock market
participation. This is also true for the recent literature that has shown the importance of social
attitudes for portfolio choice decisions. For instance, Duo and Saez (2002) and Hong, Kubik
and Stein (2004) have studied the eect of social interactions (as a mechanism through which
information can be transmitted) on participation in pension plans and in the stock market,
respectively.1
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004, 2008) have studied the eect of trusting behavior on
portfolio choice decisions. They argue that an investor's perception of the risk of an asset
depends not only on the asset, but also on subjective characteristics of the investor. The reason
is that the return may be aected by (mis)behavior of other parties. As a consequence, trust
in others matters for the subjective expected return, and less trustful individuals hold fewer
1Other explanations of limited stock market participation that have been advanced are the presence of back-
ground risk (Heaton and Lucas 2000), non-standard preferences (Barberis, Huang and Santos 2001), xed entry
costs (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), learning costs (Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz 2009, Bernheim and Garrett 2003)
and the cost of awareness (Guiso and Japelli 2005). All of these papers consider nancial assets only. Brueckner
(1997), Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Cocco (2004) analyze the inuence of the predominance of housing in
most portfolios on portfolio choice and stock market participation but do not link this to trust or to other social
attitudes.
2stocks. These authors nd empirical support for this hypothesis using data from Italy and from
the Netherlands. In a similar vein, Duarte, Siegel and Young (2010) nd that a counterparty's
perceived trustworthiness aects investors' lending decisions.
Pursuing this argument further, the rst main contribution of this paper is to include real
estate in the analysis of trust and portfolio choice. We start by sketching a very simple model
where housing, while constituting an investment, also yields ow utility from use (Section 2).
Demand for housing is determined simultaneously with the demand for other assets. If trust
aects the expected return of nancial assets, it also inuences housing investment.2
Including all important asset classes in the analysis helps pinning down more precisely the
eect of trust. In particular, including housing as a non-nancial asset allows verifying whether
trust aects only investment in risky assets or investment in nancial assets generally. The
model suggests as the most plausible scenario the one where generalized trust aects all types of
nancial assets, but has a stronger eect on risky assets, because of a larger scope for misbehavior
by other parties.
To investigate the eect of trust empirically, we use data from the European Social Survey
(ESS) and from the Survey of Household Finances (EFF) conducted by the Bank of Spain. The
ESS contains information on personal and demographic characteristics and several questions
on trust. The EFF also contains information on personal and demographic characteristics,
plus detailed information on asset holdings. The distinct advantage of using this survey for our
analysis is that it is representative of the entire wealth distribution. In particular, rich households
{ as shown, the only ones holding signicant shares of nancial assets { are oversampled, and
their asset holdings are not top-coded.
While the EFF does not contain information on trust, we can still use it by proceeding in
two steps. First, using data from the ESS, we estimate probability distributions of trust for
a large set of very detailed demographic groups dened by common age, gender, education,
income group, household size, characteristics of parents etc. We then exploit the variation in
trust between these groups to identify the eect of trust on the share of wealth invested in
2There is a large literature on real estate economics with models involving features such as minimum house
size, indivisibilities, transaction costs, the possibility of renting, mortgages etc.; see e.g. Cuoco and Liu (2000),
Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Faig and Shum (2002), Cocco (2004), Hu (2005) and Yao and Zhang (2005). While
these models are much richer than the one we use, none of these papers analyzes the role of trust.
3housing, in nancial assets and in risky nancial assets.
For this two-step approach, it is particularly important to have a good measure of trust in
the rst step. The second main contribution of the paper thus consists in measuring trust very
carefully, using a new item response model proposed by Spady (2007). This method is highly
exible and imposes very few parametric assumptions. It also allows us to use information from
a broad set of questions on trust and to exploit information contained in personal and demo-
graphic characteristics. As a result, we can avoid using distant proxies and are not restricted
to using single specic questions, which necessarily only capture a single aspect of trust, as
often seen in the literature (see e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004, 2008, 2009). Moreover,
the method weights dierent questions to reect their dierential information content, unlike
a simple average across questions as used e.g. by Fatih, Kalemly-Ozcan and Sorensen (2007).
Our measure thus encompasses several dimensions of trust, better capturing the complexity of
the concept. Using information from more than one question also yields a more precise mea-
sure, thereby reducing measurement error (see e.g. Schennach 2004). Since latent variables are
already dicult to measure, this is very valuable.
Results of the empirical analysis show that trust reduces the share of wealth invested in real
estate and raises that invested in nancial assets, with a particularly strong eect on the share
of risky assets. While we also reconrm Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales's (2008) nding that trust
raises the share of nancial assets held in risky assets, our results show that the eect of trust
is not limited to risky assets, but is broader and benets all nancial assets.
We also nd that results using a measure of trust based on one question only yields qualita-
tively similar but statistically insignicant results. Using our measure of trust, in contrast, the
eect of trust on holdings of each asset class is strongly statistically signicant, suggesting an
important gain in precision from our approach to measuring trust. Our results are also robust
to using measures of trust based on the average of responses to dierent questions on trust or a
measure computed using principal components analysis.
Finally, we show that the eect of trust is smaller for more educated or wealthier households.
This is in line with related ndings in the literature showing that wealthier investors display
less \irrational" behavior (see e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen 2003). Still, even once the eect of trust
4on the real estate portfolio share is allowed to vary with education or wealth, it is negative for
almost all households in the sample.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model of trust
and portfolio choice. Section 3 shows the structural representation of the empirical model and
describes our approach to measuring trust. The data is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we
analyze the determinants of trust and then present the empirical results on the eect of trust
on portfolio choice. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
In this section, we analyze a simple problem of portfolio choice between investment in housing
and in other assets to explore the link between individual trust and asset allocation. Suppose
that agents value consumption ct and housing ht with a period utility function u(ct;ht) with par-
tial derivatives uc();uh() > 0 and ucc();uhh() < 0 and with limc!0 uc() = limh!0 uh() = 1,
where ux denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to a variable x. Let the relative price
of housing in units of the consumption good be qt. Because of very high marginal utility of the
rst units of housing, all households with positive income will choose to hold some housing.3
Households maximize the expected discounted sum of their utility stream, discounting future
utility using a discount factor . Their income wt > 0 follows an exogenous process. They can
save by investing in housing or in two types of nancial assets; a risky asset that yields a stochas-
tic gross return rt with expected return Ei[rt] and a \safe" asset that is free of idiosyncratic
(asset-specic) risk that is expected to yield a gross return of r
f
it < Ei[rt].
Expected returns to investment dier across individuals i because of dierences in trust. All
investments require interacting with a counterparty that may potentially misbehave, reducing
the return to the investment. Trust in the counterparty implies a lower assessment of its propen-
sity to misbehave. For this reason, it is often modeled as reducing the probability the investor
attaches to the counterparty absconding or embezzling the investment (see e.g. Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales 2004). In this paper, we measure agents' generalized trust in others. Denote it by
3In the data, a small fraction of households does not own any housing. This can be explained by indivisibilities:
there is a minimum house size; agents with too small endowments to aord this resort to renting. As in Cocco
(2004), we abstract from this in this section. Hu (2005) and Yao and Zhang (2005) study the eects of renting
on portfolio decisions.
5. Agents with low generalized trust attach higher probabilities to negative events such as being
cheated by their bank (e.g. because it charges unjustied or exaggerated fees or gives them bad
investment advice), by their broker (who could embezzle the funds invested; the setting used in
Guiso et al. (2004)) or by other parties involved in the investment. A higher probability of these
negative outcomes reduces expected returns from investment.
The impact of dierences in trust on expected returns can dier across assets. It is well known
that risky investments can give rise to more incentive problems than safe ones. In fact, the assets
classied as safe in our empirical analysis (pensions, life insurances and liquid assets such as cash,
bank deposits and chequeing accounts) are subject mainly to systemic concerns about ination
or stability of the nancial system. For risky assets, these and additional concerns apply. If this
is the case, @Ei[rt]=@ > @r
f
it=@. While in principle, trust may also aect the perceived return
to investing in housing, we abstract from this possibility to keep the presentation simple.4
The way trust is modeled here, it is closely related to the risk of an investment. However,
the two notions are distinct. Risk is a property of the investment. Trust, in contrast, is a
property of the investor that aects the perceived distribution of asset returns, with an impact
that can depend on the asset. It is also distinct from an investor's risk aversion, which is about
the evaluation of outcomes, not the probability attached to them. Nothing prevents a very
risk averse investor from also being very trusting, and in eect, the empirical results show that
both trust and risk aversion matter. Finally, they also show that trust matters even for more
market-savvy investors who are likely to have better knowledge about past patterns of returns.
The eect of trust thus also is distinct from that of knowledge about nancial markets.
Assets carried over from the previous period, including housing, can be sold costlessly, and
the proceeds can be reinvested or consumed. Since assets are perfectly fungible, the pertinent
individual state variable at time t are total assets at the beginning of the period. Let this be at
and let beginning of period holdings of housing be  ht. With assets at in hand, households then
choose current consumption ct, housing ht and new holdings of the risky and the risk-free asset
4In real estate investments, the assets are tangible and can be inspected, reducing the scope for misbehavior.
Moreover, the counterparties are often known in person (in particular for residential real estate), so that less
generalized trust is required. (Trust in a particular person may still be necessary.) Results below indeed turn out
to imply that the expected return to housing is less sensitive to trust than the expected return to risk-free and
risky nancial assets, or @Ei[qt=qt 1]=@ < @r
f
it=@ < @Ei[rt]=@.
6st+1 and mt+1. Assets at the beginning of the period or cash on hand (Deaton 1991) are then
given by at  wt + rtst + r
f
t mt + qtht 1.
To write the problem recursively, denote next-period values by primes and dene the tran-
sition equation  h0 = h. Agent i then solves
V (a) = max
c;h;s0;m0

u(c;h) + EiV (a0)
	
(1)
subject to the budget constraint
c + qh + s0 + m0 = w + rs + rfm + q h; (2)
to the realizations of the income process, and given initial assets.5
In this context, the individual's inter- and intratemporal decisions cannot be separated be-
cause the housing choice enters both of them: housing yields utility, but is also a way of trans-
ferring resources to the future. Using the rst-order conditions and the envelope condition for
the agent's problem, the Euler equations for holdings of the three assets are
uc(c;h) = uh(c;h)=q + Ei[uc(c0;h0)q0=q] (3)






These three equations govern asset allocation. The rst condition shows that, apart from its
investment return, housing also yields current utility. For the other assets, we have the usual
Euler equations. Through expected marginal utility, trust enters all conditions including the
one for housing as long as there is some investment in nancial assets.
The right hand sides of these three equations equal the expected discounted marginal return
to investing in the three assets. At an interior solution, these are all equal. As the marginal
utility of housing decreases in h, the right hand side of equation (3) is a decreasing function of h.
Together with nite current marginal utility due to w > 0 and the Inada conditions, this implies
a strictly positive and nite choice of housing every period if q0=q is low enough compared to the
expected return on nancial assets. (If Ei[uc(c0;h0)q0=q] > Ei[uc(c0;h0)r0] for all asset allocations,
5Assuming that returns are low enough relative to  to make the problem bounded, it follows from standard
results that a unique value function V exists and that it is increasing and dierentiable in a.
7there is no investment in nancial assets.) Because of the high marginal utility of the rst units
of housing, agents allocate the initial units of their savings to housing. They then buy housing
until its return falls to the level of the return of nancial assets. Remaining savings are invested
in nancial assets. Relatively poor agents thus hold only housing, and only rich agents hold a
substantial amount of nancial assets.
Trust aects the portfolio choice. An increase in an agent's level of generalized trust raises
expected returns on both nancial assets, but not on housing. As a result, optimal holdings of
housing fall, and holdings of both nancial assets increase. If @Ei[r]=@ > @r
f
i =@, the share of
risky assets increases not only as a fraction of wealth but also as a fraction of nancial assets.
Evidently, other factors besides trust may also aect portfolio choice. One such factor is risk
aversion, which is present in the model in the standard way. Others, such as age or the number
of children, are omitted from the model because they are not directly related to the analysis
of trust, but may nevertheless aect portfolio choice. Portfolio shares thus are a function of
trust and these other determinants. Whether the eect of trust is signicant, and which type
of trust matters, can be inferred from regressions of the portfolio shares on a measure of trust
and other pertinent factors. If generalized trust in others, and thereby in the nancial system,
strongly aects portfolio choice, we should see the share of housing and those of both types of
nancial assets in wealth moving in opposite directions as trust changes. Dierences in trust in
intermediaries for risky products, in contrast, should move the shares of risky and safe assets
in wealth in opposite directions, with the share of housing moving like that of safe assets. Note
that to obtain the eect of trust on nancial assets overall, needed to distinguish these cases,
it is required to include housing in the analysis, as risky and safe assets as a share of nancial
assets may move in the same way for changes in either type of trust if @Ei[r]=@ > @r
f
i =@. We
next describe our empirical approach to testing the impact of trust on portfolio choice.
3 Empirical Approach
The main challenge in measuring the eect of unobservable latent attitudes such as trust on eco-
nomic outcomes lies in measuring them. One of the main contributions of this paper therefore
lies in careful measurement of trust. This section rst presents the causal structure we presup-
8pose and then discusses the implementation of the analysis, in particular the measurement of
trust.
3.1 Structural Representation
Figure 3 shows a diagram of the underlying process we have in mind. Suppose that every
individual has some amount of trust. An individual's trust directly causes the responses to
certain survey questions. It also has an eect on the individual's behavior, in particular, the
portfolio choice decision. Demographic and personal characteristics may also be informative
about the way in which trust is distributed in a population; individual characteristics and
experiences as well as community characteristics can be related to how much people trust each
other. We assume that these characteristics do not aect the answers directly. If they have
an eect on the responses, this is through their eect on trust. They can however aect the
behavior of the individual (e.g. portfolio choice) directly.
The model of trust just described has the following structural representation:
sk = hk(Xs;X;;k) (6)
Rm = gm(;um); m = 1;:::;M (7)
 = t(X;Z;") (8)
where sk is the household's share of wealth invested in asset class k (e.g. housing), Rm (m =
1;:::;M) are the responses to M survey questions,  is a measure of trust and assumed to be
univariate, X are covariates (age, number of members in the household, income and education,
marital status and family background) related to trust, Xs are other covariates aecting only the
portfolio choice decision, and Z are 17 regional dummies. The choice of covariates is discussed in
Section 4. In accordance with the model, the rst equation posits that portfolio shares depend
on a household's level of trust and on personal characteristics through an asset-specic function
hk(). It also allows for an error term k. The second equation states that the responses to
survey questions are functions only of the latent attitude and a question-specic error term um.
We assume that for all m, um  U(0;1) and that gm() is weakly increasing in um and strictly
increasing in . It is also assumed that ui ? uj 8 i 6= j and that ui ?  8 i. This implies that
conditional on , the responses are independent (Ri ? Rjj).
9Finally, trust itself may be correlated with a subset of personal and demographic character-
istics. " is the error term in this relationship. We assume that individual characteristics may
aect the latent variable , but do not aect the measurements Rm directly, and consider the
linear case
 = t(X;Z;") = X1 + Z2 + ": (9)
Dene W  (X;Z) and  = (1;2) and assume that "  N(0;1) and that " ? W. Also
assume that um ? ", um ? W,  ? " and  ? W.
3.2 Empirical implementation
If trust was observable, estimating equation (6) would be straightforward. However, although it
is very informative about personal and demographic characteristics, the EFF does not contain
direct information on trust. Therefore the approach we take is to perform the estimation in two
steps using two datasets:
Step I: Using equations (7) and (8), we obtain an estimate of individuals' trust and an estimate
of t() applying the item response theory model described in Section 3.3 to data from the ESS.
To ensure that the estimate of t() is as precise as possible, we control for many personal and
demographic characteristics. The highly exible estimation method proposed by Spady (2007)
has proven very useful for this.
Step II: Using the estimate of t() from Step I, we construct a measure of trust using the
personal and demographic information contained in the EFF. We then estimate the eect of
trust on portfolio choice decisions using a linear version of equation (6). (The linearity restriction
is easy to relax.) Since there is an equation for each asset class, we have a system of equations
with the same regressors. The ecient estimator for this setting is single-equation OLS (see
Green 2003, p. 344) or, for our case with a censored dependent variable, a Tobit model.6
6One may think that there also is an adding up condition across asset classes if the dependent variables add
to one. This is not the case for all the households; some households invest in other asset classes like jewels, art
work or business related to self-employment which we disregard. Therefore, we do not impose cross-equation
restrictions.
10The identication of the eect of trust on portfolio choice does not only rely on the functional
form of the estimate of t(), but also on additional instruments provided by the regional dummies
Z. From the measurement of trust in the rst step, we know that they are correlated with
trust (see Table 1 below), but we assume that once we control for regional housing prices and
regional nancial development, they are not correlated with the portfolio choice decision. As a
robustness check, we also perform Step II using instrumental variables, employing instruments
from Tabellini (2005).7
3.3 Measuring trust using an item response model
Given the structural representation described in Section 3.1, Step I of our approach consists in
obtaining estimates of each individual's trust and of t() by applying an item response model.
Item response theory (IRT) models have been widely used in psychometrics to measure latent
traits like ability, trust or other attitudes using test results or survey outcomes.8 They allow
to obtain quantitative measures of these concepts using all the available information, permit
the measurement of several dimensions of the latent attribute, and do not require imposing
excessive parametric assumptions. While conrmatory factor analysis has been used for the
same purposes as IRT models (see e.g. Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman 2003, Heckman, Stixrud
and Urzua 2006), IRT models deal with discrete outcomes in a more straightforward way.9
In our case, we obtain the individual measure of trust using 8 dierent questions (items) on
dierent aspects of trust, with 3 categorical responses each. In this case there are 38 = 6561
cells or possible combinations of responses (response patterns). When using such information,
IRT models are a very useful tool.
The three main assumptions made in Section 3.1 that underly our IRT model are: (1)
Unidimensionality: The questions used should reect only the individual's general trust, so the
responses are determined by a single attitude only. (2) Local Independence: The responses to the
7Using generated regressors always raises issues of consistency of the estimates and of the estimated standard
errors. In the present case, the coecient estimates are consistent and standard inference is correct for testing
the hypothesis whether the coecient on trust is zero.
8See Steele and Goldstein (2007) for a recent review of parametric hierarchical IRT.
9Takane and de Leeuw (1987) show, under specic assumptions, the formal equivalence between the marginal
likelihood of an item response model and the likelihood of a conrmatory factor analysis. In that case, the
parameters obtained using the item response model are equivalent, under some transformation, to the ones
obtained using conrmatory factor analysis.
11dierent questions on trust are stochastically independent of each other given the individual's
latent trait. This implies that the correlation between two items can only be attributed to the
individual's level of trust. (3) Monotonicity: Individuals with higher levels of trust are more
likely to choose higher answers (given the coding of the questions that we use).
The method we use also exploits information about the latent attitude contained in personal
and demographical characteristics. Equation (9), which states that at an individual level, trust
is a function of personal characteristics and an error term, implies that there is a distribution of
attitudes that is conditional on personal characteristics. Denote it by (jW;). The likelihood












where the second equality follows from the local independence assumption.
The conditional response probabilities p(Rmj) in the likelihood function are determined by
the function gm(;um) in equation (7). To capture the discrete nature of responses, gm() is
specied as a threshold function in IRT models. For example, gm(;um) = 2 if G1() < um 
G2(). With 3 possible answers to each question and a uniform distribution for u, there are 2
free thresholds. Their dependence on  captures the eect of trust on the response. Following
Spady (2007), we estimate the threshold functions Gj() as one minus the distribution function
corresponding to an exponential tilting of second degree of the uniform density. Although
parametric assumptions are needed for identication, this approach is much more exible than
traditional ones that use functions such as the logistic function or the normal.
For illustration, estimates of p(Rmj) are shown in Figure 4.10 Each box shows the prob-
ability of answering 1, 2 or 3 to a given question as a function of trust. As an example, take
the rst box of Figure 4. There are two lines. The distance between the x-axis and the rst
line indicates the probability of answering 1 in item (question) 1 (\Would you say that most
10For more information on computation, see Appendix A.
12people can be trusted?"), the distance between the rst line and the second line indicates the
probability of answering 2 in item 1, and the distance between the second line and 1 indicates the
probability of answering 3. Table 1 shows estimates of , the eect of personal characteristics
on an individual's trust. These estimates are discussed in detail in Section 5.
The measure of trust resulting from this item response model encompasses several dimensions
of this latent trait. By using eight items in our measurement, many aspects of trust are captured.
This makes the measure more reliable in two ways. Firstly, a broadly-based measure is more
reliable in the sense that it captures better the complexity of a latent trait like trust. But this
is not the only advantage, as the measure is also more reliable from a statistical point of view.
Considering that each one of the questions about trust is a proxy for trust, i.e. a measure of trust
that contains measurement error, using only one of these measures leads to regression coecients
of trust on portfolio shares that are biased towards zero (attenuation bias). The econometric
literature has suggested the use of repeated observations of the mismeasured regressor to address
this bias (see e.g. Schennach 2004). Using dierent proxies for a single concept, as we do, helps
ght the same problem in our case.
4 Data
The empirical analysis combines data from two sources, the European Social Survey and the
Spanish Survey of Household Finances. To measure trust, we use the second wave of the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a recent data set covering 25 European Countries in 2004.
In this paper we use the information related to Spain. The ESS provides rich information on
several aspects of interest to social scientists. In the 2004 round, the questionnaire includes for
the rst time a module on \Economic morality: Trust and interactions between producers and
consumers". This module is designed to investigate the normative and moral culture of markets
and consumption in European countries. It is useful for us because it has some questions about
the level of trust and condence in business and state/government institutions.
In addition, the ESS also contains information about some demographic variables that we
include in the estimation. These variables capture dierences in potential experiences faced
during life and may therefore provide further information about attitudes that our measurement
13method presented in Section 3.3 can capture. Concretely, we include age, gender, education,
employment status, income, marital status, the number of members in the household, the region
of residence and include a dummy indicating whether the respondent's father had a professional
occupation. Age allows capturing that attitudes might change over the life cycle due to personal
experience. There may also be cohort eects linked to national and global developments like
e.g. nancial crises. Since our data set is only a cross section, it is unfortunately impossible to
disentangle life cycle and cohort eects. The income coecient should mainly reect luck, as
most other determinants of income, in particular education, are also included as controls. It
seems reasonable to expect that luck, and thus past experience with others, may aect trust.
Table 2 contains summary statistics of the personal and demographic characteristics we include.
Our data include 1156 men and women older than 18.
To measure trust, we use eight pertinent survey questions (items). (For the original wording
of these items see Appendix B.) Summary statistics of the responses to these items are presented
in Table 3. The responses are recoded such that each item has three possible answers on a scale
of 1 to 3. A higher score corresponds to a higher level of trust. Answering behavior varies
over these items. For instance, the mean for the question \Can public ocials be trusted?"
is 2.178. In contrast, the mean for the question \Can politicians be trusted?" is only 1.522.
These dierences indicate that dierent items carry information on respondents' attitudes to a
varying degree. Thus, by focussing on just one or on a narrow subset of these items, valuable
information might be lost. This is also indicated by the pairwise correlation coecients for the
items shown in Table 4; correlations are positive but far from perfect. This again illustrates
that combining items can lead to a better measure of trust.
For the analysis of portfolio choice decisions we use the 2002 wave of the Spanish Survey of
Household Finances (EFF). This survey contains information about incomes, assets, debt and
consumption at the household level.11 A distinguishing feature of the EFF is that the wealthiest
households are oversampled and their asset holdings are not top-coded. So the upper quantiles
of the wealth distribution can also be studied. Since they hold most of the assets, in particular
11For a detailed description of the survey see Bover (2004). While the EFF and ESS data used do not cover
exactly the same time period (the eld work for the ESS spanned October 2003 to September 2004, that for the
EFF (October 2002 to May 2003), we do not expect this to matter much since trust changes only slowly.
14nancial assets, this is very important.
In the subsequent analysis, we will concentrate on the asset classes real estate, nancial
assets, risky assets and cash. Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for holdings of these assets.
Real estate is the largest portfolio component and makes up most of non-nancial assets. In
line with the model, nancial assets can be classied as risky or non-risky. Risky assets consist
of listed and unlisted shares, xed-income securities and mutual funds. Non-risky assets consist
of pensions, life insurances, and liquid assets (accounts and deposits usable for payments) or
\cash". In this category, we focus on cash as the main discretionary component.12 More detailed
denitions of the asset classes are given in Appendix C. Descriptive statistics of the personal
and demographic characteristics in our EFF data are shown in Table 6.
5 Results
This section rst presents the estimates of trust and its relationship to personal and demographic
characteristics, and then explores the impact of trust on portfolio choice.
5.1 The Estimates of Trust
The method described in Section 3.3 provides an estimate of trust for every individual in our ESS
sample, together with estimates of the relationship of personal and demographic characteristics
to trust. These estimates are shown in Table 1 and can be interpreted in a ceteris paribus sense
relative to a reference person.13
The factor that aects trust most strongly is the level of education. Higher levels of education
are associated with signicantly higher levels of trust. We also nd a signicant eect for the
dierent income levels. Richer and poorer households both tend to exhibit lower levels of trust
than middle-income households. Age also matters; younger and older individuals have less trust
than the middle-aged, with the peak occurring at the age of 48. This result is similar to the
ones obtained by Putnam (2000) and by Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) and consistent
12Holdings of pensions and life insurances are not much aected by trust (results not shown). Moreover, the
determinants of take-up of these savings vehicles have been studied extensively.
13The `standardized' individual is a married and employed male of 38.92 years with secondary education and
medium income who lives in a household with 3.35 members in the region of Andaluc a and whose father did not
have a professional occupation.
15with their models of social capital accumulation over the life cycle. The eect of the number of
household members has the same shape. Of course, taken together, these eects can neutralize
or reinforce each other. For instance, high education is positively correlated with high levels of
income, and their two eects can neutralize each other.
Regional characteristics such as dierences in institutions or in ethnical composition also
aect trust, as captured by the regional xed eects. These coecients show that there are
substantial dierences in trust across Spanish regions.
Using these estimated coecients allows calculating the estimated distribution of the at-
titudes for dierent demographic groups. As an example, the expected level of trust for a
respondent who is a 37 year old divorced male with low income and low education who lives in
a household with 3 members in Cantabria is -0.426, while it is 0.860 for a 50 year old married
male with medium income and high education who lives in a household with 4 members in
Madrid. We thus use the estimates to predict the levels of trust of the EFF survey respondents,
as outlined in Section 3.2.14
5.2 Testing the Eect of Trust on Portfolio Choice
The model presented in Section 2 predicts that individuals with more generalized trust invest
less in real estate and more in all types of nancial assets, measured as shares of wealth. While
holdings of risky and non-risky assets should both increase with trust, which one increases more
depends on how sensitive their expected returns are to generalized trust. Adapting equation
(6), the equations of interest then are:

















14Of course, most of the information in estimating trust comes from the questions about trust. The signicance
of results in the second step depends on how much information is captured by the personal and demographic
characteristics. The R
2 in a regression of trust on the these variables in the ESS is 10%, which is not a bad t in
a cross-sectional setting and turns out to be sucient for strongly signicant results.
16where hi is the fraction of household i's wealth invested in real estate, fai is that invested
in nancial assets, rai is that invested in risky assets and ci is that held in cash. i repre-
sents the estimated level of trust. This is constructed combining information on individuals'
characteristics with the coecients obtained previously using the European Social Survey. X
i
contains household characteristics that may aect both trust and portfolio choice (age, gender,
education, income, number of household members) and XS contains characteristics that should
only aect portfolio choice. It includes a self reported measure of risk aversion, the regional
average house price per square meter in 2002 (from Ministerio de Fomento, the Department of
Construction and Public Works) and regional nancial development. The latter is proxied by
private credit over GDP.15 We expect these characteristics to capture dierences in preferences
across households as well as possible dierences in the cost of participating in nancial markets.
Unfortunately, we do not have measures of other latent attitudes such as optimism or ex-
pectations about future economic conditions. Some authors, e.g. Puri and Robinson (2007) and
Dominitz and Manski (2005), have found these to signicantly aect participation in the stock
market. Guiso et al. (2008), however, do not conrm this, and nd that they do not aect the
coecient on trust in a portfolio choice regression either. Moreover, as our measure of trust
relies on several specic questions about trust that are reasonably unrelated to other attitudes,
we would expect them not to be a problem for the estimation in the present setting.
Table 7 shows the results of the estimated tobit regression. The rst two columns show the
estimates of equations (11) and (12). Trust has a signicantly positive eect on the percentage
of wealth invested in nancial assets and a signicantly negative eect on the percentage of
wealth invested in housing, bearing out the theoretical predictions.
As the eect of trust is conditional on wealth, it also applies to the richest households. Our
results are thus consistent with the argument by Guiso et al. (2008) that trust could be a factor
limiting nancial market participation even for rich households.
Other estimates are also consistent with other straightforward theoretical predictions. More
risk averse households invest more in housing and less in nancial assets. Higher housing prices
15This is a common proxy for nancial development. Other proxies that have been used in the literature like the
market capitalization of listed rms over GDP are not available at the regional level for Spain, as the securities
market is at the national level.
17reduce the housing share and raise that of nancial assets. The housing share falls with income
and education and rises with the number of family members.
The last two columns of Table 7 show the estimates of equations (13) and (14). Trust
has a signicantly positive eect on the portfolio shares of both risky assets and cash. The
other coecient estimates in these regressions are similar to those obtained for nancial assets
generally. The eect of trust on risky assets is stronger than that on cash. This is conrmed
in Table 8, which shows results for the same regressions, using the shares of risky assets and
cash over nancial assets (instead of wealth) as the dependent variables. The regression is set
up exactly like the analogous regression in Guiso et al. (2008, Table 7) on Italian data,16 and
our results parallel theirs: agents with higher levels of trust hold a signicantly higher share
of risky assets as a fraction of nancial assets. Even the magnitude of the trust coecient we
obtain is very close to that in Guiso et al. (2008), with a one standard deviation increase in
trust increasing the share of risky assets over nancial assets by just under 5 percentage points
in both their and our results.
Other measures of trust. To assess the robustness of our results, we conduct the same
regression using dierent alternative measures of trust (see Table 9). For the measure Trust
(single question), we simply use the response to the question, \Would you say that most people
can be trusted?" The measure Trust (mean of responses) is computed using the mean of the
responses to the 8 questions on trust. The measure Trust (Principal Components Analysis)
consists in the rst component of a principal components analysis on the 8 questions on trust.17
Finally, the measure Trust (in banks) consists in the response to the question \How much do
you trust nancial companies such as banks or insurers?"18
Results from these regressions are shown in Table 9. In all specications, we also control for
16This implies using household nancial wealth instead of net wealth, and letting income and wealth enter only
linearly.
17The rst component is the linear combination of the 8 questions on trust that explains most of the variation
in the data. Note that standard principal components analysis has been developed for continuous data and, unlike
the IRT measure, does not take into account the discreteness of our data.
18As these measures are not contained in the EFF, using them requires a two-step procedure analogous to that
used for our main measure of trust. In the rst step, we regress the obtained measures on the same demographics
used for our main measure. We use an ordered probit for this when using a single measure or the mean of the
responses and an OLS regression when using the result of the principal components analysis. In the second step,
we use the coecients obtained from the rst step to impute a measure of trust in the EFF data.
18the same variables as in Table 7, but display only the coecient on the measure of trust. The
rst panel of the table reproduces results from Table 7 obtained using the IRT measure. The
signs of all the estimated coecients on generalized trust are the same as those obtained using
the IRT measure of trust. Those obtained using a single question only are not signicant. This
can be attributed to attenuation bias due to the presence of more measurement error in trust
when only such a simple measure is used. When using the mean of responses or the measure
obtained using PCA, the coecient on cash is not signicant.
Results obtained using the IRT measure thus are robust to using other measures of trust.
However, recall that among these measures, the IRT measure is the only one that explicitly takes
into account discreteness and that weights the dierent items according to their information
content.
Education, wealth and trust. Does trust matter equally for everyone? The estimates on the
eect of trust on portfolio choice in this section are conditional on, among other things, education
and wealth. Yet it might be the case that more educated and wealthier households have more
information about nancial markets and a better understanding of how these markets work.
Indeed, e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) shows that wealthier investors display less \irrational"
behavior. Similarly, the eect of trust may vary with education or wealth.
To test this, we run the portfolio choice regressions including interactions between trust and
years of education and between trust and log wealth. Results are shown in Table 10.19 The
rst result to note is that in both cases, the sign of the coecient on trust is unaected by
the inclusion of the interactions. The coecient also remains highly signicant (except for one
case).
The interaction with education takes the opposite sign of the coecient on trust for all asset
classes, indicating that education reduces the eect of trust on portfolio choice decisions. This
is particularly pronounced for risky assets. The marginal eect of trust on housing remains
negative and that on nancial assets positive for all households in the sample. The interaction
with wealth also takes the opposite sign of the trust coecient. Still, the coecient on trust
19The rest of the specication is the same as before, with similar results, so we only report the coecients
related to trust.
19dominates, and the marginal eect of trust on the housing share is negative for almost all the
households in the sample.
Education and wealth thus reduce the impact of trust on portfolio choice, possibly through
greater information about nancial markets or access to nancial consultants. Nevertheless,
trust has a signicant marginal eect for almost all the households in the sample, and thus
matters even when potential dierences in nancial education are taken into account.
Endogeneity Concerns. The identication of the eect of trust on the portfolio decisions
has relied on the nonlinearity of the trust measure and on the assumption that the regional
dummies are not correlated with nancial decisions once we control for regional house prices
and regional nancial development. To be able to relax this assumption we estimate the model
using instrumental variables. To instrument trust, we use the same variables as Tabellini (2005)
in his inuential study of the impact of culture on development: the regional literacy rate at
the end of the 19th century and indicators of political institutions in the period from 1600 to
1850. We also include the number of social and economic charity organizations in the region in
1920.20 Tabellini (2005) argues that \historically more backward regions (with higher illiteracy
rates and worse political institutions) tend to have specic cultural traits today: less trust in
others, less respect for others, less condence in the individual." The validity of the historical
instruments is discussed extensively in his paper, so we do not reiterate it here. Table 11 shows
the values of the instruments for the Spanish regions.
The results of the IV tobit estimation are shown in Table 12.21 The results of the rst-stage
regression in the rst column show that the instruments are strongly correlated with our measure
of trust (see the p-value of the F-test associated to the excluded regressors). A Wald test for the
instruments indicates endogeneity problems only in the regression involving risky assets. For
the other regressions, the tobit estimator used above thus is more appropriate because it is more
ecient. Indeed, while in some cases the coecient on trust obtained using the instruments is
20The literacy rate is dened as the percentage of the population over 10 years old able to read and write in
1877 and is from Nunez (1990). Institutions are measured as constraints on the executive and are from Tabellini
(2005). The number of charities is from the Anuario Estad stico de Espa~ na published by the National Statistics
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estad stica).
21The estimation is conducted using Amemiya's Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimator for tobit with
endogenous regressors (see Amemiya 1974, Newey 1987). Again, only the trust coecient is reported.
20larger (in absolute value) than the one obtained using OLS, the standard errors are also much
larger. For the regression involving risky assets, the IV estimator is adequate. As before, it
yields a strongly signicant positive coecient.
The IV estimates thus support the results obtained above. Trust signicantly aects portfolio
choice. Households with more trust hold less real estate and more nancial assets, in particular
risky ones, as a share of their wealth.
To summarize, all specications support an eect of generalized trust on portfolio choice. House-
holds with more trust hold a smaller share of their wealth in real estate and a larger share in
nancial assets. More in detail, trust has a particularly strong eect on the share of wealth
held as risky assets (compared to holdings of liquid assets), implying larger holdings of risky
assets as a fraction of nancial assets. While this is in line with Guiso et al.'s (2008) results,
we can go further and show that what matters is generalized trust, not just trust in banks as
intermediaries of risky assets. This is supported both by the pattern of results in the analysis of
wealth portfolio shares and by results from including a direct measure of trust in banks in the
analysis. To obtain these conclusions, it is crucial to include housing in the analysis and not to
limit the analysis to nancial assets.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the analysis of the eect of trust on portfolio choice to include the most
important component of households' portfolios, real estate. We show that households with less
trust invest more in housing and less in nancial assets, in particular risky ones. In contrast
to earlier results, trust thus aects all nancial assets, not just risky ones, though the eect
on these is strongest. Trust hence not only constitutes a factor behind limited stock market
participation, but may play a larger role in relation to nancial development more generally.
For obtaining these results, our use of a new method for measuring latent variables (Spady
2007) is crucial. This method is exible and allows taking into account information from many
questions on the latent attitude plus additional information from personal characteristics. The
resulting measure of trust covers more dimensions of the concept than measures based on proxies
or individual questions and also is more precise, reducing measurement error and producing more
21signicant results.
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26Appendix
A Computational procedure for measuring trust
The estimation proceeds as in Spady (2007) and is by maximum likelihood, with the likelihood
function given by (10). The integration for the probability of a particular outcome for individual i
conditional on that individual's characteristics (p(R1;R2;:::;RmjW) =
R
p(R1j)p(R2j):::p(Rmj)(jW)d)
has been carried out using Gaussian quadrature at 200 grid points. To ensure that we can collect
even the distributions with small variances, the Gaussian quadrature has been applied to 5 dif-
ferent segments of the grid, with the one in the middle having more points. A Newton-Raphson
algorithm is used to maximize the log-likelihood function. Concretely, we use the BFGS method
which builds an approximation to the Hessian instead of calculating it numerically.22
We obtain 61 parameters; 29 associated to the personal characteristics (indicating the eect
on location relative to the probability distribution of the `standardized respondent') and 32
describing the distribution functions depicted in Figure 4. Since we use exponential tilting
of second degree, we estimate two parameters per line and box for the distribution functions.
The parameters associated to the personal characteristics are the ones used to specify t(), and
therefore the parameters of interest in our case.
B Original wording of the questions/items we use to estimate
trust
The following, including the footnotes, is an extract from the ESS questionnaire. Answers
originally are on a scale from 0 to 10, 10 being the most trustful answer.
 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be
too careful in dealing with people?23
 Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance,
or would they try to be fair?24
22For a general discussion about estimation procedures for this type of models, see Rodriguez (2008).
23Can't be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat suspicious.
24Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat appropriately and straightforwardly.
27 Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly
looking out for themselves?25
 Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out.
{ the legal system
{ politicians
 How much would you trust the following groups to deal honestly with people like you?
{ plumbers, builders, car mechanics and other repair people26
{ nancial companies such as banks or insurers.
{ public ocials27
C Denition of the nancial variables used in the empirical
analysis
 Total Assets is the value of Real Assets and Financial Assets.
 Real Assets is the value of Real Estate, Jewellery, Works of Art, Antiques and the value
of Business related to self-employed.
 Real Estate is the value of Main Residence and Other Estate Properties.
 Financial Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted Shares, Fixed-Income Securi-
ties, Mutual Funds, Pensions and Life Insurances and Accounts and Deposits usable for
payments.
 Risky Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted Shares, Fixed-Income Securities and
Mutual Funds.
 Cash refers to Accounts and Deposits usable for payments.
 Non-Risky Assets is the value of Cash plus Pensions and Life Insurances.
25The intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic helpfulness.
26Builders include all kinds of tradespeople who work on building sites.
27Public ocials refers to both government ocials, such as customs ocers and to local ocials, such as
housing/building regulators etc.
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Figure 1: The Spanish Wealth Distribution
Notes: EFF data. The gures display averages by percentile of the distribution of total assets. Real Estate is the
value of Main Residence and Other Estate Properties. Financial Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted
Shares, Fixed-Income Securities, Mutual Funds, Pensions and Life Insurances and Accounts and Deposits usable
for payments. Risky Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted Shares, Fixed-Income Securities and Mutual
Funds.
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Figure 2: Participation Rates in Real Estate and Risky Assets
Notes: EFF data. The gures display averages by percentile of the distribution of total assets. Real Estate is the
value of Main Residence and Other Estate Properties. Financial Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted
Shares, Fixed-Income Securities, Mutual Funds, Pensions and Life Insurances and Accounts and Deposits usable
for payments. Risky Assets is the value of Listed Shares, Unlisted Shares, Fixed-Income Securities and Mutual


















Figure 3: Structural representation
Notes: Graphical representation of equations (6) to (8). Investment choices depend on both personal and demo-
graphic characteristics and on trust. Responses to survey questions on trust depend only on trust. Trust itself
may be correlated with personal and demographic characteristics.
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Figure 4: Estimates of item response probabilities p(Rmj) as functions of trust 
Notes: Each box refers to one question (item). Trust is on the x-axis. Answers to each question can be 1, 2 or 3.
The probability of answering 1 is given by the distance between the x-axis and the lower line, the probability of
answering 2 by that between the two lines, and that of answering 3 by that between 1 and the upper line.
32E Tables
Table 1: The relationship between personal and demographic characteristics and trust
Variable Coecient S.E. Variable Coecient S.E.
Divorced -0.198 (0.194) Aragon 0.249 (0.236)
Single -0.039 (0.111) Asturias -0.060 (0.238)
Female -0.090 (0.069) Baleares -0.240 (0.208)
Age 0.010 (0.004) Canarias -0.117 (0.201)
Age2 -0.053 (0.026) Cantabria -0.145 (0.247)
Num Members 0.065 (0.032) Castilla La Mancha 0.377 (0.177)
Num Members2 -2.875 (0.941) Castilla Leon 0.071 (0.173)
Low Income -0.124 (0.149) Catalunya 0.061 (0.126)
High Income -0.241 (0.114) Extremadura 0.459 (0.299)
Primary Degree -0.026 (0.093) Galicia 0.201 (0.170)
High Degree 0.432 (0.092) Madrid 0.358 (0.133)
Unemployed -0.266 (0.152) Murcia -0.125 (0.231)





Notes: Estimated using the European Social Survey, 2004 wave. Num Members is the number of house-
hold members. Age
2 is dened as (Age   mean(Age))
2=100 and Num Members
2 as (NumMembers  
mean(NumMembers))
2=100. The coecient indicates the change in the mean estimate of trust as a variable
changes compared to the standardized individual. The standardized individual is a married and employed male
of 38.92 years with secondary education and medium income who lives in a household with 3.35 members in
Andalucia and whose father did not have a professional occupation. Standard errors in parenthesis.
33Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Personal and Demographic Characteristics used for Mea-
suring Trust (ESS)
Demographics Mean Region Mean
Single 0.349 Andalucia 0.183
Divorced 0.042 Aragon 0.028
Married 0.599 Asturias 0.029
Num Members 3.349 Baleares 0.024
(1.313) Canarias 0.043
Unemployed 0.056 Cantabria 0.011
Low Income 0.145 Castilla La Mancha 0.071
Medium Income 0.662 Castilla Leon 0.079
High Income 0.193 Catalunya 0.113
Father Professional 0.087 Extremadura 0.023
Primary Degree 0.270 Galicia 0.055
Secondary Degree 0.477 Madrid 0.136
Higher Degree 0.237 Murcia 0.035
Female 0.480 Navarra 0.015




Notes: Estimated using the European Social Survey, 2004 wave. All variables except for Num Members (number
of household members) and Age are dummies. For these two continuous variables, the standard deviation is
reported in parentheses. Low Income: <12000 euros/year, High Income: >90000 euros/year. Primary Degree is
1 if the individual has less than secondary education, and Higher Degree is 1 if the individual has a university
degree or more.
34Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the survey responses used to estimate trust
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Most People can be Trusted 1.914 0.773 1 3
Most People Fair 2.029 0.772 1 3
Most People Helpful 1.657 0.747 1 3
Trust Legal System 1.829 0.796 1 3
Trust Politicians 1.522 0.671 1 3
Trust Repair People 2.072 0.872 1 3
Trust Banks 1.875 0.867 1 3
Trust Public Ocials 2.178 0.808 1 3
Observations 1156
Notes: Estimated using the European Social Survey, 2004 wave. For exact wording of the questions, see Appendix
B.
35Table 4: Pairwise Correlation Coecients for the Items Used to Estimate Trust
Most Most Most Trust Trust Trust Trust Trust IRT
People can People People Legal Politi- Repair Banks Public Trust
be Trusted Fair Helpful System cians People Ocials Estimate
Most People...
can be Trusted 1.00
are Fair 0.43 1.00
are Helpful 0.38 0.30 1.00
Trust in...
Legal System 0.18 0.13 0.15 1.00
Politicians 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.45 1.00
Repair People 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.04 1.00
Banks 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.35 1.00
Public Ocials 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.40 1.00
IRT Trust
Estimate 0.85 0.65 0.60 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.26 1.00
Notes: Estimated using the European Social Survey, 2004 wave. The rst 8 variables are the raw survey responses
to the questions informative about trust. The last one is the estimate of trust obtained by applying an item
response model to these 8 items. For exact wording of the questions, see Appendix B.
36Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Variables (EFF)
Mean Std. Dev. Quantiles
Value (in e1,000) 0.25 0.50 0.75
Total Assets (TA) 475.3 4133.2 79.4 162.3 354.6
Real Assets (RA) 340.3 3125.8 71.8 148.8 300.0
Real Estate (RE) 254.8 488.9 65.0 138.0 275.1
Financial Assets (FA) 135.0 1242.3 1.7 9.0 41.1
Risky Assets (RA) 104.5 1214.9 0 0 6.0
Non Risky Assets (NRA) 30.5 95.5 1.5 6.0 24.0
Cash (C) 8.2 25.2 0.9 3.0 7.5
Value/Total Wealth
Real Assets/Wealth (RA/W) 0.788 0.299 0.752 0.923 0.980
Real Estate/Wealth (RE/W) 0.737 0.317 0.639 0.870 0.970
Financial Assets/Wealth (FA/W) 0.212 0.299 0.020 0.077 0.248
Risky Assets/Wealth (RA/W) 0.051 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.023
Non Risky Assets/Wealth (NRA/W) 0.161 0.277 0.014 0.048 0.143
Cash/Wealth (C/W) 0.101 0.246 0.006 0.018 0.052
Observations 4999
Notes: We use the 2002 wave of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF). Asset classes dened as
described in Appendix C.
37Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Portfolio Choice Analysis (EFF)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Risk Aversion 3.70 0.58 Num Children 0.90 1.08
Income (in e1,000) 40.4 76.0 Num Members 2.77 1.34
Net Wealth (in e1,000) 463.8 4216.2 Years Education 13.64 7.27
Female 0.35 Employee 0.32
Age Head 57.65 15.62
Observations 4999
Source: 2002 wave of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF).
38Table 7: Tobit estimation for portfolio choice
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.035  0.045  0.055  0.024 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011)
Risk Aversion 0.042  -0.035  -0.073  -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Housing Price -0.057  0.076  0.037  0.065 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010)
Financial Development 0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln Income -0.125  0.074  0.210  0.111 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.080) (0.027)
(ln Income)2 0.004  -0.002 -0.008  -0.005 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
ln Net Wealth 1.142  -0.936  -0.088  -0.668 
(0.028) (0.021) (0.023) (0.015)
(ln Net Wealth)2 -0.045  0.037  0.007  0.025 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.026  -0.010 -0.016 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005)
Age Head 0.001 0.004  -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age Head2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num Members 0.016  -0.017  -0.022  -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Num Children -0.012 -0.003 0.017  -0.010 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
Years Education -0.004  0.006  0.007  0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Employee 0.080  -0.011 -0.023  -0.017 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007)
Constant -5.747  5.481  -1.095  3.796 
(0.244) (0.205) (0.427) (0.156)
Observations 4999 4999 4999 4999
The left hand side variables are: (1) the value of real estate over total wealth, (2) the value of nancial assets over
total wealth, (3) the value of risky assets over total wealth and (4) the value of liquid assets over total wealth.
Trust is our measure of generalized trust, computed using 8 dierent questions and an item response model. Risk
Aversion is a self reported measure. Housing Price is the regional average house price per square meter in 2002.
Financial development is proxied by the amount of private credit in the region over its GDP (see Table 11). ln
Income is the log of the household's income. ln Net Wealth is the log of the household's net wealth. Female is a
dummy equal to one if the head of the household is a female. Age is the age of the head of the household. Num
members is the number of members in the household. Num children is the number of children in the household.
Years of education are the number of years the head of the household attended school. Employee is a dummy
variable that is equal to on if the head of the household is an employee. Standard errors in parentheses; stars
indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels, respectively. 39Table 8: Tobit estimation for portfolio choice, specication as in Guiso et al. (2008)
RA/FA C/FA
Trust 0.128  0.017
(0.040) (0.030)
Risk Aversion -0.108  -0.016
(0.015) (0.013)
Financial Development 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Income -0.019 0.054 
(0.015) (0.012)




Age Head -0.008 -0.009 
(0.005) (0.004)
Age Head2 0.000  0.000 
(0.000) (0.000)
Num Members 0.004 -0.013
(0.018) (0.013)
Num Children 0.008 -0.003
(0.020) (0.015)
Years Education 0.01  -0.003
(0.002) (0.001)
Employee -0.077  -0.068 
(0.025) (0.019)
Constant -1.917  2.922 
(0.207) (0.155)
Observations 4999 4999
The left hand side variables are: (1) the value of risky assets and (2) the value of liquid assets over the value
of nancial assets. Trust is our measure of generalized trust, computed using 8 dierent questions and an item
response model. Risk Aversion is a self reported measure. Housing Price is the regional average house price per
square meter in 2002. Financial development is proxied by the amount of private credit in the region over its
GDP (see Table 11). ln Income is the log of the household's income. ln Net Wealth is the log of the household's
net wealth. Female is a dummy equal to one if the head of the household is a female. Age is the age of the head
of the household. Num members is the number of members in the household. Num children is the number of
children in the household. Years of education are the number of years the head of the household attended school.
Employee is a dummy variable that is equal to on if the head of the household is an employee. Standard errors
in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels, respectively.
40Table 9: Tobit estimation for portfolio choice, comparing dierent measures of trust
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.035  0.045  0.055  0.024 
(IRT measure) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011)
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.003 0.024 0.031 0.012
(single question) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012)
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.073  0.081  0.153  0.025
(mean of responses) (0.031) (0.034) (0.049) (0.027)
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.024  0.023  0.041  0.007
(PCA measure) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007)
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.027 0.004 -0.024 0.003
(in banks) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.003)
Sample Size 4999 4999 4999 4999
The left hand side variables are: (1) the value of real estate over total wealth, (2) the value of nancial assets over
total wealth, (3) the value of risky assets over total wealth and (4) the value of liquid assets over total wealth.
Each specication includes a dierent measure of trust as an independent variable: Trust (IRT measure) is the
measure of generalized trust computed using 8 questions and the item response model. This specication is the
same as that in Table 7. Trust (single question) is a measure of generalized trust computed using the question
\Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?" Trust (mean of responses) is a measure
of generalized trust computed using the mean of the responses to all 8 questions on trust. Trust (PCA measure)
is a measure of generalized trust computed using the rst component of a principal components analysis on the 8
questions on trust. Trust in banks is computed using the question \How much do you trust nancial companies
such as banks or insurers?" (See footnote 18 for more details on how these measures have been computed.) In
all specications, we also control for the same variables as in Table 7 (coecients not shown). Standard errors in
parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
), 5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels, respectively.
41Table 10: Tobit estimation for portfolio choice: The Role of Education and Wealth
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.066  0.073  0.146  0.034
(0.029) (0.026) (0.043) (0.021)
Trust  Education 0.002  -0.002  -0.005  -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust -0.404  0.507  0.522  0.023 
(0.094) (0.079) (0.114) (0.059)
Trust  Education 0.000 0.001 -0.004  0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Trust  Wealth 0.030  -0.040  -0.032  -0.018 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Observations 4999 4999 4999 4999
The left hand side variables are: (1) the value of real estate over total wealth, (2) the value of nancial assets over
total wealth, (3) the value of risky assets over total wealth and (4) the value of liquid assets over total wealth.
Trust is the measure of generalized trust (computed using 8 questions). Trust  Education is an interaction
between our measure of trust and the number of years the head of the household attended school. Trust  Wealth
is an interaction between our measure of trust and the log of net wealth held by the household. In addition, we
control for the same variables as in Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
),
5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels, respectively.
42Table 11: Instruments and Variables with Regional Variation
Financial Regional Literacy Rate Early Political Charity Org.
Development Housing Price in 1887 Institutions in 1920
Andaluc a 77.00 914.97 26.25 1 0.118
Aragon 72.72 1013.62 29.00 3 0.039
Asturias 69.54 985.89 40.50 1 0.021
Baleares 86.95 1525.95 21.00 1 0.058
Canarias 67.16 1218.04 18.50 1 0.018
Cantabria 69.26 1183.22 40.50 1 0.021
Castilla Leon 67.12 1012.56 48.50 1 0.236
Castilla La Mancha 64.91 681.00 29.00 1 0.042
Catalunya 89.56 1553.95 32.00 3 0.182
Extremadura 66.76 557.25 20.00 1 0.027
Galicia 65.13 800.08 27.50 1 0.051
Madrid 121.37 1973.78 62.00 1 0.294
Murcia 82.13 747.40 21.00 1 0.018
Navarra 74.84 1290.22 45.50 1 0.021
Pais Vasco 87.16 1900.44 48.50 1 0.042
Rioja 79.92 1061.41 45.50 1 0.021
Valencia 84.48 877.26 21.00 3 0.097
The Regional Housing Price is the average regional house price per square meter in 2002, calculated by the
Ministry of Development and Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento). Financial development is proxied by the
amount of private credit in the region over its GDP as reported by the National Statistics Institute (INE). Literacy
rate is the percentage of the population over 10 years able to read and write in 1877, from Nunez (1990). Early
political institutions is a measure of constraints on the executive, from Tabellini (2005). Charity Organizations
is 1000 times the amount of charity organizations per capita existing in each region in 1920 as reported in the
Anuario Estad stico de Espa~ na published by INE.
43Table 12: IV Tobit estimation for portfolio choice.
Dependent Variable: Trust RE/W FA/W RA/W C/W
Trust 0.080  0.101  0.297  0.008








Wald Test Exogeneity 0.335 0.121 0.000 0.150
Observations 4999 4999 4999 4999
The rst column reports rst-stage results. In the remaining columns, the left hand side variables are: (1) the
value of real estate over total wealth, (2) the value of nancial assets over total wealth, (3) the value of risky
assets over total wealth and (4) the value of liquid assets over total wealth. Trust is the measure of generalized
trust (computed using 8 questions and an item response model) and is instrumented using Literacy rate, Early
political institutions and Charity Organizations (see Table 11). In addition, we control for the same variables as
in Table 7. p-value (excluded) is the p-value associated to the F-test of signicance of the exogenous variables.
The Wald test for exogeneity tests if the residuals of the OLS regression of trust on the instruments are signicant
when included in the regression of portfolio share on trust. Values higher than 0.05 are weak evidence against
the null hypothesis that trust is exogenous. Standard errors in parentheses; stars indicate signicance at 10 (
),
5 (
), and 1 (
) percent levels, respectively.
44